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Abstract. This  paper  reconstructs,  in  non-formal  terms,  the  development  of 
Vilfredo Pareto’s writings on what was to become known as “Pareto optimality”. 















This paper aims at reconstructing, in non-formal terms, the deve-
lopment of Vilfredo Pareto’s writings on what was to become known as 
“Pareto optimality”. After some references to the context in which Pareto 
begun to undertake investigations into welfare economics (1), I shall reveal 
the early versions of the definition of maximum ophelimity for the society 
(2). After recounting the first significant academic reactions, by Walras and 
Wicksell, to Pareto’s innovative concept (3), I then elaborate on the develop-
ment of Pareto’s final specification of his economic optimum (4-5). I shall 
close the paper with a few comments on the sociological adaptation that 
Pareto made to his economic optimum (6).
Pareto’s interest to welfare economics stems from his personal political 
views, which favoured free trade and liberty in economic, political and social 
matters more generally. In short, he was motivated to apply the tools of pure 
economics to demonstrate that a liberal economy is, according to new and 
non Ricardian criteria, better than an economy in which state intervention 
plays an important role. However, one of the important, and possibly unex-
pected, results of his research was to demonstrate that the application of pure 
economics alone is incapable of establishing the superiority of the liberal 
economy relative to a socialist economy; a conclusion that Pareto reached 
more than a decade before Enrico Barone came to the same conclusion in his 
famous 1908 paper. Among the innovations associated with Pareto’s work on 
welfare issues, there are a number of conceptual and terminological clarifi-
cations. Notable in that regard are: the definition of maximum ophelimity 
for the society in economics1; and, in sociology, the definition of maximum 
utility for the society (which refers to the utility of the single members of the 
society) as distinct from maximum utility of the society (which refers to the 
utility of the society as a whole). 







1. BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Before I start to reconstruct the evolution of what would become known 
as Pareto optimality2, it is interesting to make reference to the background of 
such Paretian investigation.
The first study in which Pareto reflected on the economic proper-
ties of freedom (whose proxy is free competition) was an article of 1891, 
Socialismo e Libertà (1974), where he stated that contemporary society was neither 
founded on free competition nor on private property. Rather, it was founded 
on the action that the State carried out in favour of the affluent classes, thus 
creating a bourgeois socialism (Pareto, 1974 [1891], p.384). Having specified 
this, he still favours the liberal system on the basis of empirical evidence that 
presents “freedom as lesser evil” (ibid., p.404).
Around the same time, Pantaleoni and his student Angelo Bertolini accom-
plished an original attempt of liberal theoretical foundation, in the essay Cenni 
sul concetto di massimi edonistici individuali e collettivi (1892). 
The two authors, who explicitly refer to Edgeworth’s Mathematical 
Psychics (1881), stated that through individual or collective optimal action (that 
is to say, action performed according to the law of the minimum means), both 
individual and collective hedonistic maximum could be achieved (Bertolini, 
Pantaleoni, 1892, p.293-294, note 1). Individual hedonistic maximum means 
“the fullest state of well-being” (ibid., p.301), collective hedonistic maximum 
means the equitable distribution of goods, if all individuals have the same atti-
tude “towards felicitation” (ibid., p.302). On the contrary, if individuals do not 
have the same attitude cited above, collective maximum means the unequal 
distribution of goods that gives more to those who possess this attitude to a 
greater extent (ibid., p.303). Among the four possible combinations between type 
of action (individual or collective) and type of resulting maximum (individual 
or collective), Pantaleoni and Bertolini dwelt mainly on free competition, defi-
ned as an “outstanding form of individual work” that enables the achievement 
of both individual and collective hedonistic maximum (ibid., p.297-298). 
2   For a study on the formal aspects of this topic refer to Montesano (1991).
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Pantaleoni gave a draft copy of this essay to Pareto. Initially Pareto regarded 
the hedonistic principle as a stimulus to further epistemological study, such 
as in the Considerazioni fondamentali sui principi dell’economia politica pura (1892-1893; 
see Pareto, 1984, p.101-102 – letter to Pantaleoni of December 6th, 1891). With regard 
to Cenni sul concetto..., Pareto merely pointed out that those who knew the collective 
hedonistic maximum did not necessarily want to accomplish it (ibid., p.99-100). 
But Pareto soon became aware of the Walrasian approach to this issue, that is 
to say, the competitive general equilibrium which implies, but does not demons-
trate, the situation that Pareto shall define as the maximum ophelimity for the 
society (1894a, p.149). Pareto immediately noticed that such an approach involved 
a degree of circularity (1964 [1896-1897], §65). A theorem, of course, cannot 
imply its premises: so the Walrasian theorem cannot imply that the private 
propriety gives rise to the maximum ophelimity for the society as the private 
property is one of the premises of this theorem. Many years later, Pareto (1968 
[1916], §21291) would extend his criticism by agreeing with his student Pierre 
Boven, who had argued that Walras reasoned in circle when suggesting that 
maximising behaviour by individuals leads to collective maximisation because 
he had been inspired by a sentiment favourable to free competition and contrary 
to monopoly. As demonstrated later in this paper, Pareto escaped this Walrasian 
circularity by developing an entirely new analysis of collective welfare.
It is finally interesting to note that Pareto highlighted that if on one hand it 
is not possible to compare interpersonally, and therefore not possible to add the 
ophelimities of different individuals (1966 [1906], chapter IV, §32), instead it is 
possible to compare the ophelimities of individuals which do not deviate much 
from an average type. In a nutshell, Pareto considered the practical possibility 
of comparing ophelimities that the average man3 feels in different conditions, 
empirically represented by actual individuals who differ very little from such 
an average man (1964 [1896-1897], volume II, §646). As I shall see infra, Pareto 
subsequently followed up on the notion of comparability among individuals, 
3  Similar to the representative agent of microeconomics of our times.
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although by means of a theoretical stratagem in economics and by resorting, in 
sociology, to a comparison made by the government.
On balance, I believe that Pareto’s focus on the issue of maximum opheli-
mity for society has its origin in two distinct sources: first, from his passion for 
liberalism; and second, from the attempts by Pantaleoni, Bertolini and Walras 
to investigate collective welfare, which Pareto found interesting but logically 
and methodologically unsatisfactory. As a consequence, he set out to develop a 
new theoretical demonstration of the optimizing property of free competition. 
2. THE FIRST THREE VERSIONS OF PARETIAN OPTIMALITY
Pareto supplied his first version of Paretian optimality in the article Il 
massimo di utilità dato dalla libera concorrenza (1894b), which began by recognizing that 
Walras had shown that free competition maximizes collective ophelimity in 
the hypothesis of constancy of both prices and production coefficients. While 
Pareto considered the case of variable consumer prices to be largely irrele-
vant from a theoretical perspective, he remained of the original view that it 
is important to study the effect of variations in the production coefficients on 
economic welfare (ibid., p.48). He undertook his study by starting from Walras’s 
assumption that the production coefficients minimize the cost of production 
under conditions of free competition (ibid. – quotes Walras, 1889, p.321). Pareto 
accomplices the minimization of production cost by: envisaging that the prices 




... are constant; obtaining “from the technical 
conditions of production” the implicit functions that link the n production 






,...)=0...; obtaining from such 
production functions, that every production coefficient for the production of a 
good depends on the other n-1 (ibid., p.50). All of the above stated, Pareto set out 
the minimization first order conditions for every equation of the cost of produc-
tion differentiating it with respect to the n-1 production coefficients: therefore 








=0... are obtained. Along with the m 
production functions, they give rise to a system of mn equations whose solution 
creates just as many production coefficients to minimize production costs.
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The first step of this second phase of his demonstration involves the appli-
cation of the method previously adopted by Walras in his The geometrical theory of 
the determination of price (1892; ibid., p.50-51). Given the quantities of goods consu-
med by an individual and the associated prices of those goods, this method 
facilitates the calculation of the ophelimity that corresponds to the quantity 
of a numéraire good4. By summing all the ophelimities, so determined, of every 
individual, one obtains the ophelimity which the society made by those indivi-
duals benefits from. Similarly, ophelimities that individuals sacrifice to produce 
goods can be expressed as quantities of a numéraire good. 
Pareto does not deal with the exact allocation among individuals of overall 
ophelimity enjoyed as a result of consumption and sacrificed as a result of 
production. But he asserts that the ophelimity enjoyed (sacrificed) by every 
individual is all the greater (lower) the greater (lower) is the overall ophelimity 
enjoyed (sacrificed). Pareto shows also that if one wants to deliberately alter the 
distribution of goods produced, it would be more “convenient” (more efficient 
in a welfare sense) to re-allocate directly the ophelimity from individual to 
individual than altering the production coefficients of free competition5. 
That being stated, since the ophelimity by each individual depends on the 













leads to an increase in ophelimity enjoyed by the individual. 

































6. The ophelimity enjoyed by the society 






























 the ophelimity for the society expressed in 
quantities of good a. However, an increase in production coefficient a
s
 also 















For society as a whole, welfare is maximised when the positive difference 
between total ophelimity enjoyed and total ophelimity sacrificed is greatest, 
which is achieved when the value of a
s






























also the m production functions one therefore has a system of m(n-1)+m=mn 
equations whose solution determines just as many production coefficients, 
which maximize the net ophelimity enjoyed by society (ibid., p.54).
The third and last phase of the demonstration consists in checking that the 
production coefficients determined under conditions of free competition coin-
cide with those maximizing the net ophelimity for society. The demonstra-
tion involves differentiating the equations that specify the quantities of every 
production factor (required to produce the quantity of goods in the collective) 
with respect to a coefficient of production (ibid., p.55-56).
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+... When these are multi-




,... and recognising that the price of individual goods 




















































As the expression of the second term between parentheses above is equal to 
zero7, this solution is consistent with cost minimising production coefficients 
and, thereby, maximizes the net ophelimity for the society. However, Pareto 
also emphasized that coefficients of free competition were not those in force in 
contemporary society (1964 [1896-1897], §721). But even more importantly, he 
stressed that the theorem “can be accepted equally by liberals and socialists”, 
as it relates to production and not to the distribution of goods (1894b, p.61).
Pantaleoni and Barone informally objected to Pareto’s demonstration 
because he summed the ophelimities of individuals, which were heteroge-
neous and therefore not capable of summation. Pareto then prepared a revised 
demonstration of the result (ibid., p.58-60). 
Pareto observes that when production coefficient a
s
 varies by da
s
, the ophe-























































Such equation must be set to equal zero to meet the first order condition of 
individual maximum ophelimity. As goods have positive ophelimity, φ
a
 
has a positive value, so maximisation is predicated on expression between 
parentheses summing to zero.
However, the number of individuals is θ, so there is a system of θ equations, 
but only one unknown quantity to determine (the production coefficient a
s
). 
Consequently, the system would be over determined if the bracketed term was 
equal to zero for all individuals. So, in the face of da
s
, some individuals may 
experience a loss in ophelimity as represented by the numéraire good a (a nega-
tive value for the term in parenthesis) or a gain in ophelimity (a positive value 
for the term in parenthesis). Pareto indicated non-zero values for the term in 
parenthesis with λ. If all λ are positive (negative), all λφ
a
 are positive (nega-
tive) which implies that the ophelimity for the collective certainly increases 
(decreases) and therefore it is advisable to let a
s
 increase  (decrease) further. If, 
however, some λs are positive and other are negative, some individuals would 
7  To maximize the net ophelimity for the society.
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benefit from this while others would be disadvantaged. Of course, for different 
individuals, welfare, λφ
a
, is not comparable because the unit of φ
a
, is incon-
sistent between people. However, as φ
a
 is positive for goods and λ is accounted for 
















+...=λ are expressed 
in terms of quantity of good a), Pareto points out that it is still possible for 
those who gain to economically compensate those who lose as long as the sum 
of the λs8 is positive. Compensation is no longer possible when the sum of the 
λs is zero or negative – and variations in a
s 
should end when the sum of all λ is 
zero as at that point the ophelimity for the society is maximised. 
In his subsequent Cours d’Économie politique (1964 [1896-1897], §3852, §7212), 
Pareto proposed a new, and clearer, version of the demonstration. He starts 
from the notion that an individual, thanks to a small increase dλ of the quantity 
of gold at his disposal, can increase quantities of goods consumed and reduce 
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 is positive, the sign of dU depends on the sign of dλ. If dλ of all indi-
viduals is positive (negative), then dU of all individuals is positive (negative) 
and the ophelimity for the society increases (decreases). So, if one intends to 
maximize the ophelimity for the society (which for instance would be the 
objective of a futuristic socialist state) it is necessary to continue and let the 
quantities of goods and productive factors vary along the direction (opposite 
to that) followed so far. As already demonstrated in 1894 paper, the maximum 
ophelimity of society is reached when the sum of dλ is zero. In fact, until 
the sum is positive (negative), by varying the amounts of goods and services 
along the direction (opposite to that) followed so far, one obtains an additio-




for society. Finally, Pareto showed that one reaches the zero sum of dλ also 
adopting production coefficients that minimize production costs that is to say, 
adopting free competition coefficients (ibid., §723). 
As shown in the next paragraph, Pareto’s mathematical skill appealed to 
Walras. It is interesting to stress the cumbersome but rather clear strategy 
followed by Pareto in his demonstration. In the first trial, he successively 
detects the coefficients of free competition, the coefficients maximizing the 
ophelimity for the society and, at the end, he demonstrates that both corres-
pond. In the second and in the third trial, Pareto, in an innovative way, begins 
by the variation of the ophelimity of individuals; subsequently he demonstrates 
that the variations are indirectly homogeneous (due to a clever Walrasian stra-
tagem) and summable. In the end, he finds the maximum ophelimity for the 
society by using the customary first order condition for maximising a function. 
3. WALRAS AND WICKSELL’S COMMENTS 
The Paretian attempts to identify the conditions for an efficient economic 
organization of society gave rise to some contemporary comments by Walras 
and Wicksell.
Walras qualifies Il massimo di utilità dato dalla libera concorrenza as “illuminating”. 
The minimization of production costs, the maximization, with regard to ophe-
limity, of the functions of demand and supply of services and the indication 
of “coherence” of both optimization procedures “was undoubtedly the way 
forward” to attain the demonstration of the optimality of free competition 
(Walras, 1965, p.605 – letter to Pareto of July 9th 1894). Nonetheless, Walras adds 
that he had already given such a demonstration. In that regard, the prices of 
general equilibrium under free competition, determined through the tâtonnement 
process, maximize the ophelimities of the owners of production services, whose 
sum gives the maximum total ophelimity for the society. Therefore, the Paretian 
demonstration is simply a confirmation of the Walrasian one and of the “excel-
lence of the theory as a whole” (ibid., p.607). But Pareto replies that the Walrasian 
demonstration is applicable only to the case of fixed production coefficients, 
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whereas his own demonstration constitutes a more general treatment because 
production coefficients are variable. Moreover he aims at indicating, contrary 
to what was requested by socialists, that there is no greater collective opheli-
mity than the one “obtained by the game of the entrepreneurs’ competition” 
(Pareto, 1975, p.250 – letter to Walras of July 20th, 1894). With specific regard to 
Pareto’s analysis based on λ, Walras agrees that it represents “a pure creation of 
political economy” that will enable Pareto to construct a comprehensive applied 
political economy (Walras, 1965, p.611 – letter to Pareto of July 25th, 1894).
In contrast, Wicksell stressed that  trading at prices different from those 
given by free competition equilibrium could yield advantages that are greater 
than those achieved at competitive equilibrium prices. Actually, φ is the func-
tion of total ophelimity of any trader and depends on the available amounts 
x and y of goods A and B (the first received and the second transferred); the 
budget constraint is y=px, where p is the price of A (in terms of B) given 
under free competition (Wicksell, 1958 [1897], p.143, note 1). If the price 
increases by Δp, so that the new price system no longer correspond to that 
given under free competition, the change in ophelimity may be represen-
ted as Δφ=(∂φ/∂x)Δx-(∂φ/∂y)Δy=(∂φ/∂x)Δx-(∂φ/∂y)(pΔx+xΔp) which, after 
accounting for the condition that the maximum ophelimity for individual 
traders ∂φ/∂x=p∂φ/∂y, becomes Δφ=-(∂φ/∂y)xΔp. Summing such Δφ for all 
traders one obtains ∑-(∂φ/∂y)xΔp, which, in general, is not zero. Therefore, 
Wicksell found that the change in ophelimity might be positive when prices 
are not those given by free competition. He found that it is only under special 
circumstances that prices given under free competition will maximize opheli-
mity, such in the case where all the traders own the same quantities of goods. 
In fact, according to Wicksell, the economic equality implies that ∂φ/∂y is 
equal for all the individuals, which transforms ∑-(∂φ/∂y)xΔp into -(∂φ/∂y)Δp∑x 
that in free competition, where ∑x=0, is cancelled (ibid.). 
The agreement between Pareto and Walras on the Paretian demons-
tration of maximum ophelimity for the society is one of the rare positive 
episodes in their intellectual relations. However, Pareto does not appear to 
be aware of the above mentioned Wicksellian criticisms which, as we have 
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seen, does not deal with the intricate question of comparability among indi-
vidual ophelimities and, most of all, aims at destroying the original Paretian 
support for free competition.
4. THE PARETO-SCORZA CONTROVERSY
In 1902, the mathematician Gaetano Scorza (1902a, p.300) stated that “we 
are still very far from being able to give a mathematical proof of the laissez faire, 
laissez passer principle”9. Pareto responded vehemently, stating that the opheli-
mity maximization condition of individuals represents freedom of exchange, 
but this alone does not demonstrate maximisation under free competition 




... are total utilities of 
the individual traders, the change in individuals ophelimity will be positive for 
some traders and negative for other traders when the original state is defined by 












... are positive. It is 
therefore on this occasion that for the first time Pareto explicitly and formally 
defined his definitive criterion of maximum of ophelimity for the society (ibid., 
p.410-413). Pareto then showed with a long algebraic example (ibid., p.415-420), 
that this result is achieved when the following conditions are valid: maximum 
ophelimity of individuals, positivity of degrees of ophelimity of each commo-
dity, and zeroed sum of quantities traded. At this point he underlined that these 
conditions subsisting in case of free competition, this latter “leads to” maximum 
ophelimity for society (ibid., p.420). This maximum is described geometrically 
by the point of tangency between two indifference curves (one for each trader). 
There is anyhow a locus of ophelimity maxima upon every point one reaches, 
either through free competition (defined as the organization where prices are 
constant) or through “other different regulations, provided that they are duly 
selected”, for instance “a tyrant who compelled those who barter to get the same 
results as free competition” (ibid., p.421-422, p.431). As I shall see in the following 
paragraphs, Pareto largely restricted himself to repeat, in his future works, the 
results obtained in this paper, although with some additions and clarifications.
9  On the controversy see the important reconstruction by McLure (2000).
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5. PARETIAN OPTIMALITY IN THE MANUEL D’ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE
In his Manuel d’Économie politique (1966 [1906]) Pareto envisages the maxi-
mum of ophelimity for the society as a property of the general economic 
equilibrium and he defines it as the position from which any small variation 
increases the ophelimity of some and reduces the ophelimity of others (ibid., 






 the total ophelimities of the n indivi-
duals; δ all “the variations [...] that are compatible with the constraints of the 











 the variation of the quantity of good a owned by 
anyone among n individuals, with such quantities that, it is explicitly said, are 
therefore homogeneous among them and summable (ibid., §127-129). He there-
fore maintains the formal definition of maximum ophelimity already found in 
the controversy with Scorza, specifying that it implies that δΦ are nil, for some 
individuals, positive, for other individuals, and negative for others (ibid., §89). 
Similarly Pareto, for the case in which traders accept market prices, restates 
that if equilibrium takes place in a point of tangency between indifference 
curves, the society benefits of the maximum ophelimity: in fact if one shifts 
from such point, the ophelimity of a trader increases, while the other one 
decreases (ibid., chapter VI, §34-35, §43)10. 
Further studying the results of 1902, Pareto highlights that if the sales 
revenues of a commodity are greater than its total production cost (as in 
the case of monopoly), this positive difference could be spread among 
members of society, which implies that the δΦ of beneficiaries are positive 




















The maximum of ophelimity for society is obtained when (i) total revenues 
equal total costs and (ii) prices reflect marginal costs (ibid., appendix §90, §92). 
This double condition is not met by free competition in the important case 
where prices are constant and there are positive fixed costs (ibid., §92). Actually 
it would need to have consumers pay a fixed amount for a commodity, selling 
them later the units of commodities at their marginal costs (ibid., chapter VI, 
§45-48, §58): the private firms (and therefore free competition) cannot do it 
whilst collectivism can do it.
So, Pareto’s conclusion remains in contradiction with the liberal passion, 
which had been at the origin of his interest for the maximum ophelimity for the 
society. In order to achieve the maximum ophelimity for the society, pure econo-
mics does not enable us to say whether it is preferable for the economy to be based 
on private property and free competition or on a collectivist one (ibid., §60-61).
6. MAXIMUM UTILITY IN SOCIOLOGY 
In view of the impossibility of comparing the ophelimities of individuals, 
in economics there can only be a maximum ophelimity for the society (that, 
as I have discussed amply above, takes into account the only variations of the 
individuals’ ophelimities) and not the maximum ophelimity of the society 
(which should precisely consider the ophelimity of society taken as a whole). 
But in sociology, however, Pareto relaxes this restriction and allows for 
interpersonal subjective comparisons, albeit with reference to sentiments. 
Therefore, in sociology there are the maximum utility for the society and 
maximum utility of the society (Pareto, 1968 [1916], §2133-213). By way of 
example, a situation of prosperity with strong national income inequality may 
be an example of a maximum utility of the society while a situation involving 
a weaker national income and less inequality in the distribution of income 
might be an example of maximum utility for the society, based on subjective 
interpersonal comparisons (ibid., §2135).
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More formally, in Pareto’s sociological treatment of collective welfare, one 




,... (each one of them assigned to every 













,... are subjectively assigned welfare 
weights for individuals 1, 2 and so on: for instance a humanitarian may assign 
high α to himself (e.g. individual 1) and to the criminals he supports (e.g. indi-
vidual 2) but a very low α to the victims of crime (ibid., p.340). This process 









+...=0, one for each member of the society. However, 
the equations for each individual are still heterogeneous. To reduce this system 
of equations to a single homogeneous social welfare relationship, the assigned 
weighting α
 
of the various equations are multiplied by β1, β2, which are politi-
cally allocated values “determined in view of an objective end [...] for instance, 
the prosperity of the community”(ibid.). This work of homogenization might 
be accomplished by the government. If, for instance, they considered that 
“it  is necessary, for the prosperity of the community, to punish criminals”, 
the government shall attribute low β to the equations of humanitarians and 
criminals and high β to those of their victims (ibid.). Thus the individual equa-

































































government that aims at the maximum utility of the society as a whole, shall not 








+...=0 as if he 


















ficed”. In fact in a sub-optimal situation, the individuals protected by the govern-
ment would be in a worse situation than in an optimal situation (ibid., p.341).
There is no space in the present paper to investigate the relationship between 
economics and sociology in Pareto’s thought. However, a few observations on 
the issue can be made. Based on a study of Pareto’s entire scientific output, one 
can venture the idea that Pareto was neither an economist nor a sociologist; 
rather, he remained always a social scientist. His interests focussed, over and 
over again, on economics or on sociology due to his temporary moods and, 
most of all, due to his teaching load: the Cours d’Économie politique (1964 [1896-1897]) 
and the Systèmes socialistes (1965 [1901-1902]) are the outgrowth of long series of 
lectures. Surely, over time, the underlying schema of equilibrium, if often inte-
rwoven and refined, unified Pareto’s treatment of economic and sociological 
issues. Finally Pareto’s economics is the study of economic equilibrium whilst 
Pareto’s sociology is the study of social equilibrium. The concepts of economic 
and sociological maxima support the above thesis to Pareto’s complementary 
approach to economics and sociology.
CONCLUSION
Pareto began to deal with the maximum ophelimity for the society in the 
1890 when he was driven by an enduring passion for economic liberalism and 
a dissatisfaction with the way Pantaleoni, Bertolini and Walras had dealt with 
the topic. This paper has attempted to conceptually reconstruct Pareto’s various 
efforts to define the conditions for optimality. Initially he successively equa-
ted optimality, as a maximum of ophelimity for the society, with production 
coefficients obtained under free competition (those which minimize produc-
tion cost). But following the critics by Pantaleoni and Barone, Pareto alters his 
demonstration strategy by gradually reaching the definition of maximum as a 
situation in which movement away from a point would advantage someone, 
but disadvantage someone else. To reach this result, taking into account that 
in economics, individual ophelimities are not comparable, Pareto in various 
manners makes use of the stratagem borrowed from Walras, to transform the 
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individual ophelimities variations into comparable quantity variations of the 
same commodity. So, Pareto defines the maximum by using the customary 
first order conditions for maximising a function. In a well-known article of 
1902 and in the Manuel d’Économie politique, Pareto develops the formal presenta-
tion of what was to become universally known as a Pareto optimum. Moreover 
he provides a geometrical representation of his results. But, it is very important 
to stress too that in the Manuel d’Économie politique Pareto finds that pure econo-
mics is unable to establish whether free competition or collectivism is the best 
form of economic organization from the point of view of reaching the maxi-
mum ophelimity for the society. 
Finally, while Pareto’s economic analysis of optimality avoids interpersonal 
comparisons of welfare, he retreats from that position in sociology. Pareto’s 
sociology recognises that people do make interpersonal comparisons. In view 
of this, he considers how social welfare might be logically maximised if we 
account for the fact that individuals, and governments, frequently use subjec-
tive sentiments to assess their own welfare and the welfare of other members 
of the society. As a result, Pareto elaborates new notions, different from the 
maximum ophelimity for the society but complementary to it, of maximum 
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